A few inconsistencies in Dignitas Infinita
In general, I thought Dignitas Infinita did quite a good job of restating what I believe is the most solid and consistent argument for human rights and freedoms. It is predicated on the belief that every human life is sacred, because we are all made in the image of God.
Belief in the ideals should entail opposition to the death penalty and war as much as to abortion. And the authors recognise that fundamental rights and human dignity should not be contingent on privilege, as is commonly the case in the secular world. Sometimes it can seem like the Church is a voice in the wilderness, in a world which is increasingly plagued by poverty, inequality, violence, oppression and armed conflict.
After reading the sections that I assume were supposed to address the rights of transgender people ('gender theory' and 'sex change'), I had to question whether I could take seriously the Church's current position on this, or even know what its position would be if the bishops and cardinals educated themselves about it.
The vagueness obfuscates the reasoning (if any), there is an absence of any argument for the authors' assertions, and they rail against a complete misrepresentation of what transgender people experience. There is also not a single example, reference or citation in the sections for whatever the authors claim opposition to. The authors should have researched the issue properly before taking a blunt position that will increasingly be at odds with scientific understanding, what most Catholics will know to be right.
According to Dignitas Infinita, 'gender theory' is among the 'grave and current violations of human dignity', alongside war and poverty.
'Regrettably, in recent decades, attempts have been made to introduce new rights that are neither fully consistent with those originally defined nor always acceptable. They have led to instances of ideological colonization, in which gender theory plays a central role; the latter is extremely dangerous since it cancels differences in its claim to make everyone equal.'
I can only assume, in the absence of any concrete definitions, that it's referring to our efforts to preserve the basic rights of transgender people.
The term 'transgender ideology' is often used as a label for our opposition to a movement that's relentlessly trying to outlaw the public existence of transgender people. There have been a couple hundred proposals for laws, in the United States, that aim to gradually achieve precisely that, and it's supported by well-funded lobby groups trying to do the same here in Britain. Were the authors trying to proclaim that transgender rights should be opposed, because of the unsubstantiated idea they conflict with the fundamental rights of others?
It just might be that a more nuanced 'gender theory' is much closer to the truth than a biological essentialist and reductionist view of human nature. The complexity of what God created seems beyond our capacity to understand, and doesn't lend itself well to categorisation and human interpretations of 'natural law'. Life experience tells us this.
I believe it does make sense to see the terms 'male' and 'female' as generalisations, and it's more appropriate, in most contexts beyond sexual interactions, to consider a person male or female according to how that person presents him/herself. For most intents and purposes, a transgender woman is a woman.
Clearly, the authors hadn't consulted anyone who experienced gender dysphoria, and all that comes with it, before adding the following paragraph:
'Desiring a personal self-determination, as gender theory prescribes, apart from this fundamental truth that human life is a gift, amounts to a concession to the age-old temptation to make oneself God, entering into competition with the true God of love revealed to us in the Gospel.'
The theological arguments for biological essentialism (and for discriminating against 'actively gay' people) are refutable, especially to those who know that our understanding of the natural order is incomplete. Being gay or transgender must ultimately be the result of natural processes we don't understand, and it's not something that could be mandated away by the Church's current moral philosophy.
My outward appearance - the dresses, the makeup, and the rest of it - is the most honest expression of who I am, and a conformity to my intrinsic nature. My story is still one of vulnerability, self-doubt, precariousness and uncertainty about the futre, and I'm sure any transgender woman would say the same. This is about as far from a 'temptation to make oneself God' (which is a logical impossibility anyway) as could be imagined.
Following that is a section on sex change. It is a restatement of biological essentialism.
Biological sex is a foundation for important social interactions and human networks, I agree. A man and a woman are needed to produce life, and a 'traditional' heterosexual marriage between them is the ideal structure for raising a family, and consequently for realising our potential. This is an ideal I subscribe to, but, again, life experience tells us that committed relationships between gay people, and committed relationships involving transgender people, can be equally as valuable as a basis for marriage and adoption.
'It follows that any sex-change intervention, as a rule, risks threatening the unique dignity the person has received from the moment of conception. This is not to exclude the possibility that a person with genital abnormalities that are already evident at birth or that develop later may choose to receive the assistance of healthcare professionals to resolve these abnormalities.'
Given what I've mentioned about transgender people potentially following the dictates of natural processes, the moral distinction here between a sex change and a correcting of abnormalities seems quite arbitrary. Wouldn't including this assertion in Dignitas Infinita imply that a transgender person had a different level of entitlement to human dignity than a person with abnormalities before surgery?